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1 Introduction
Over the years, the use of computers for financial and health related activities has grown
exponentially. To ensure the integrity of the data produced by these activities, governments have begun
setting regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley as a broad outline to help mitigate risk of theft or
manipulation. These policies however allow formultiple interpretations that can cause confusion within
an organization. This provides difficulty when evaluating acceptable controls and resources required to
comply with government standards.
Through my research, I found it very difficult to find information that could provide in-depth
technical guidance to meet compliance regulations, or research in the integration of available solutions
into a complete automated system for control and auditing. I found many tools and papers available to
aid with "security best practices", identitymanagement, privileged access control, auditing, etc, yet
nothing to pull this information together [7] [8] [9] [ 1 0] [ 1 1 ] [ 12] [ 1 3] [ 14] [ 1 5] [ 16] [20] [23] . Even guidance
frameworks such as COBIT[24] or COSO[25] do not provide technical specifications or integration. I
have therefore designed a unique and automated approach for compliance remediations, focusing on the
implementation ofpreventative and detective controls in a UNIX environment.
2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Due to multiple scandals and financial misrepresentations ofpublicly traded companies, investors
lost billions ofdollars and began to lose faith in the national stockmarket. As a result, the
Sarbanes-
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OxleyAct of2002 was created to force publicly traded companies to provide reasonable assurance that
their financial statements were not fraudulent.
The Sarbanes-OxleyAct provides reasonable assurance that fraudulent activity has not and will not
occur inmanyways. It mandates the creation of an auditing oversight board that will ensure the
companymeets current government standards. It defines the role for auditors responsible for analyzing
financial statements and internal controls. It defines corporate responsibility to meet these regulations as
well as places accountability on uppermanagement if they are not met. Uppermanagement can suffer
monetary losses and even be imprisoned if controls are not met or fraudulent activity is detected.
Finally, public financial disclosure is required. If a company fails to meet government regulations, this
information will become public knowledge and could drastically affect stock prices and future growth of
the company.
The Sarbanes-Oxley act has been divided into 1 1 sections, each containing multiple subsections.
Section 404 will be the primary focus of this thesis since it provides the most impact to IT Departments.
It states:
Section 404
Management Assessment OfInternal Controls
(a) RULES
REQUIRED- The Commission shall prescribe rules requiring each annual report
required by section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) to contain an
internal control report, which
shall-
(1) state the responsibility ofmanagement for establishing andmaintaining an adequate
internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting; and
(2) contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of the issuer, of the
effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial
reporting.
(b) INTERNAL CONTROL EVALUATION AND
REPORTING-With respect to the
internal control assessment required by subsection (a), each registered public accounting
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firm that prepares or issues the audit report for the issuer shall attest to, and report on, the
assessment made by the management of the issuer. An attestation made under this
subsection shall be made in accordance with standards for attestation engagements issued
or adopted by the Board. Any such attestation shall not be the subject of a separate
engagement [4].
Essentially, it is management's responsibility to implement and evaluate internal controls for
systems that in some way house or process financial data. As you can see, the actual implementation for
these internal controls are not defined and therefore left to interpretation. Typically, organizations rely
on frameworks such as The Committee ofSponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
framework [25] or the Control Objects for Information and related Technology Framework [24] to
provide additional guidance in these areas [17]. These frameworks however also lack a technical
implementation and simply provide an overview ofcontrol best practices.
2.1 COBIT Framework for Internal Controls
Control Objectives for Information and related Technologies (COBIT) was created as an IT controls
framework that fits with and supports the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO) Internal Control
- Integrated Framework, the widely accepted control framework
for enterprise governance and riskmanagement [24]. The COBIT framework, compiled from the
consensus of experts, is designed to support IT governance by providing a foundation ofbest practices
in amanageable and logical structure. The framework is particularly focused on controls and processes,
and less on the technical implementation. This allows the framework to be effective inmany
organizations where technical implementations vary depending on the organization's needs, while still
providing a reasonable amount of
guidance.
The COBIT framework has been broken down into four logical sections
discussed below.
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2.1.1 Plan & Organize
The Plan & Organize section ofCOBIT is the first step for remediation efforts. It provides an
outline ofhow to perform a risk assessment, determine a strategic plan for remediation, and to devise
project plans to ensure remediation efforts are completed on time and to specifications. This thesis
covers many parts of this section (PO01, PO02, PO03, PO09, and PO10) by discussing risk assessment
and an overall strategic plan for remediation.
2.1.2 Acquire & Implement
The Acquire & Implement section ofCOBIT is the second step for remediation efforts. It
provides an outline ofhow to identify areas better served by automated solutions, to manage changes,
and proper procedures to install automated solutions and change management. The identification and
implementation of automated solutions can be very useful for limiting resources and time required for
maintenance and auditing. Since the actions are automated, an auditor must only test the
implementation once to verify that it is effective. Any additional audits can rely on previous findings to
demonstrate that changes made by the system had no user interference and therefore have a low
likelihood of fraud, providing the system has not beenmodified. Changemanagement is important for
tracking all changes that cannot be automated, creating an appropriate audit trail. This thesis covers
many parts of this section (All, AI2, AI4, AI6, and AI7) since it relies on the creation of a functional
change management system and the integration ofmultiple automated solutions.
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2.1.3 Deliver & Support
The Deliver & Support section ofCOBIT is the third step for remediation efforts. It provides an
outline ofhow to manage and support IT systems to meet the needs of the business. Since the final
solution presented in this thesis will require little to no external support, section DS7 "The Education
and Training of
Users"
will be the only section covered.
2.1.4 Monitor & Evaluate
TheMonitor & Evaluate section ofCOBIT is the fourth and final step for remediation efforts. It
provides an outline ofhow to monitor and evaluate IT performance and internal controls, as well as
ensure systems meet regulatory compliance. This thesis primarily focuses on sectionME1, the
monitoring and evaluation of IT performance. Once the solution described in the Total Integration
section of this document is set in place, log informationwill automatically be sent to appropriate
management allowing them to monitor their employee's actions and evaluate their performance. It is
then the responsibility of the internal audit teams to evaluate Internal Controls (ME2) to ensure they
meet regulatory standards (ME3).
3 Risk Assessment
No matter how hard one tries, it is impossible to 100% guarantee that an IT system does not contain
a flaw or workaround that can in some way affect financial data. Also, it is difficult when evaluating IT
systems to determine appropriate controls and at what priority they should be implemented. This is
where the process of risk assessment comes in.
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Risk assessment is a tool used to identify and quantify potential risks. Listed below are the steps
outlined in the Information Security Risk Assessment [29] documentation to perform a risk assessment.
Basic Elements of the Risk Assessment Process:
Identify threats that could harm and, thus, adversely affect critical operations and assets. Threats
include such things as intruders, criminals, disgruntled employees, terrorists, and natural
disasters.
Estimate the likelihood that such threats will materialize based on historical information and
judgment ofknowledgeable individuals.
Identify and rank the value, sensitivity, and criticality of the operations and assets that could be
affected should a threat materialize. This will help to determine which operations and assets are
most important.
Estimate, for the most critical and sensitive assets and operations, the potential losses or damage
that could occur if a threat materializes, including recovery costs.
Identify cost-effective actions to mitigate or reduce the risk. These actions can include
implementing new organizational policies and procedures as well as technical or physical
controls.
Document the results and develop an action plan.
As you can see, risk is determined by the identification of a potential threat. It is then quantified by
the likelihood that an event could occur and the potential damages as a result of the event. Ifyou
discovered a flaw that can potentially be exploited by the majority ofusers, and as a result would cost
the organization billions in revenue, this item would be classified as a high risk since it has a high
likelihood ofoccurrence and would have extreme financial effects on the organization. However, if a
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flaw was identified that can only be exploited by a select few, and as a result would only cost the
organization twenty dollars, it would likely be identified as a very low risk. Using this quantification, it
is much easier to determine priorities when planning and budgeting to correct these areas.
SOX Auditors also use risk assessments when performing their testing and evaluations. These risk
assessments are used to evaluate the effectiveness of internal controls. If they discover an internal
control is not effective, and therefore allows for a very high level of risk, theywill classify it as a
"Material
Weakness."
If an internal control is weak and allows for a high level of risk, it will be
classified as a significant deficiency. If an internal control is moderately weak and allows for some level
of risk, it will be classified as just a deficiency. Finally, if an internal control passes testing and is not
identified as the three classifications above, it shows that the auditor has "Reasonable
Assurance"
that
the control is effective. The term "Reasonable
Assurance"
is used since there is never a 100% guarantee
that a control is effective or that somethingwas not overlooked, just that there is a reasonable amount of
supporting evidence to convince the auditor otherwise.
3.1 Risk Management
Now that we understand Risk Assessments, we can use this information to help with risk
management. Risk management is quite simply how to deal with risk; should it be corrected or
accepted? Clearly if there is a risk that could drastically affect the company (for instance an auditor
discovers a material weakness on a financial system) projects should be set in place to reduce the risk as
much as possible. In some cases, the elimination of risk is not possible, however the reduction of risk
from a material weakness to a deficiencywill still significantly improve the security of financial data
and provide some assurance to the auditors. If there is an instance where complete risk remediation is
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not possible or the cost/benefit ratio is not justifiable, than the organizationmay choose to accept the
risk. By doing so, they are stating that they are aware of the risks involved and assume responsibility if
the risk is exploited. I would recommend against this unless there is no other option. Also, despite the
fact that someone is assuming responsibility, the risk is still present and will be included in the auditor's
final report to the public.
3.1.1 Risk Management - Personal Recommendation
When correcting risk, it is best to prioritize. Iwould recommend starting with material weaknesses
and work your way down to deficiencies. Amaterial weakness will hurt you farmore during an audit
than a deficiency. I would also recommend prioritizing the cost and time effective remediations first. If
you have a choice between correcting thirty deficiencies that will take two hours each or one that will
take two months, clear up the thirty deficiencies first. Eliminating a greater number ofdeficiencies will
demonstrate to the auditors that you are making significant progress, and severely reduce the number of
reported deficiencies on the final audit report.
4 Security Best Practices
Keeping up with current security best practices will require an extensive amount ofwork, however
this is one of the most important things an organization can do to protect their systems and financial
data. Every day, hackers are discovering new vulnerabilities and methods to compromise your systems.
The longer security best practices are left out ofdate, the more vulnerable and higher likelihood you will
have to be hacked.
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For a generic UNIX operating system, there is a best practices listing that has remained fairly
consistent over the years. This listing includes:
Physical Security - Physical security for any computer system is very important. With
physical access, amalicious user could unplug the system causing a loss of service and
potentially losing data, or they could reboot the system off a disk or network and gain root
access. With root, they couldmodify the system and data as they see fit. Physical access to
the system console either locally or remotely can also be very dangerous since the user could
interrupt the boot process to gain access. Also, be very careful not to leave the console or a
systems administrator terminal logged in. These are excellent areas formalicious users to
exploit without having to force their way onto the system.
MaintainMinimum Services - The more services and applications running on a system, the
more areas of exploit are available to a hacker. Therefore maintaining the minimum number
of services required to meet business needs is extremely important. When installing the
operating system, only install essential components needed. If the system does not require a
GUI, don't install one, etc. Once installed, youmay need to disable additional services
depending on the operating system. Finally you must close all network ports that are not
explicitly needed for the system and applications to function.
Use Strong Passwords
- A common attack for any system is the attempt to crack passwords.
By configuring the system to only allow strong passwords; passwords with upper and lower
case letters, numbers, and symbols, theywill be farmore difficult to crack. Passwords
should be changed on a consistent basis. Even strong passwords can be cracked given
enough time. If a password is changed on a consistent basis, it limits the amount of time a
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hacker has to crack and exploit the password. Hopefully by the time the password is
cracked, it has been changed, leaving the cracked password useless. Finally the accounts
should lock after a number of incomplete password attempts. Hackers will try to crack a
password by continually logging in. If the account locks after x passwords tried, then the
attacker only has x chances to guess the correct password.
Accounts'
being locked also
alerts the administrator that a password-cracking attempt may have been, or is still
occurring.
Use Different Passwords - Use different passwords for each account on each system. This
will prevent a hacker from cracking a single password and gaining access to more than one
account or system.
Divide privileges By dividing privileges among a number ofuser accounts, the exploitation
of a single account will only provide a limited amount of access, reducing the amount of
damage that could possibly be caused.
Terminal Timeout Policy
-
Every user in an organization can potentially aid in a security
breach by not locking their terminals. Having worked in a corporate environment, I have
seenmany instances where users with privileged access or access to sensitive datawalk
away from their computers unlocked, leaving them wide open for anyone to use. By setting
a timeout policy for approximately five to tenminutes, it limits the amount of time available
for a user to realize the system is unlocked and exploit it.
Restrict Users - User's should not have any additional access beyond what is required to
perform their jobs. With the use of a user identity management system and a privileged
access management system, one can easilymeet these specifications.
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Reduce System Dependencies - System dependencies increase the number of attack vectors
for amalicious user. Such things as file shares, remote executable configurations like RSH,
etc, can be exploited to affect the stability and integrity of financial systems and their data.
User Training
-
Properly training users on system usage and common security issues can
drastically reduce the possibility that a hacker can socially engineer or exploit a user's lack
of security knowledge to gain access or information.
Patching
-
Security patching is extremely important since it will repair security
vulnerabilities discovered after the system was released. Every day, new security
vulnerabilities are found and reported to software vendors. Hackers are also aware of these
vulnerabilities and attempt to exploit them. By keeping your system patches up to date, it
will drastically reduce the number ofvulnerabilities that can be exploited by hackers. That
is why it is recommended to patch your systems every three to six months ormore as
needed.
Vulnerability Testing
- Despite following all of the previously listed best practices, certain
things may be overlooked or administrators may not be aware of. By performing regular
vulnerability tests on your systems, you may catch and resolve vulnerabilities before they
are exploited.
Log Reviews
- Malicious attempts to compromise a system are typically documented in the
system logs. By periodically reviewing, ormaintaining a system to automatically review
and alert on log activity, youmay be able to detect and prevent malicious activity before it
adversely affects the business.
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Backup and Disaster Recovery - It is always good practice to plan for the worst, just in case
an unforeseen event occurs. Administrators may accidentallywipe out the system, hackers
may compromise data, or a tornado may take out your data center. By being adequately
prepared for these occurrences, you can easily recover the system and data, with little to no
effect on the business.
There is a likelihood that additional security best practices are available relating directly to the
systems your organization is using. These best practices can be acquired through organizations such as
SANS Institute [16], CERT [39], or through your system vendor. By institutionalizing these practices,
you will have a far less likelihood ofbeing compromised, and be able to recover should an event occur
without a drastic affect on the business.
5 Change Management
Change management is a very important piece to any organization since it controls the tracking and
the appropriate authorizations to incur change. It can force the requirements for adequate testing before
implementation into production. It also has the ability to enforce Segregation ofDuties, which is the
division of responsibilities such that a single person cannot implement more than one phase of an
operation.
According to CobiT 4.0 [24], all changes, including emergencymaintenance and patches relating to
infrastructure and applications within the production environment must be formallymanaged in a
controlled manner. Changes (including procedures, processes, system and service parameters) must be
logged, assessed and authorized prior to implementation and reviewed against planned outcomes
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following implementation. This assures mitigation of the risks ofnegatively impacting the stability or
integrity of the production environment [24].
Although change management seems fairly straight forward, the implementation of a system that
will meet the current needs of an organization and their needs in the future can be fairly difficult. Each
facet of an organizationmay require different change management procedures and processes. The
identification and construction of a system that will meet these restrictions, as well as the identification
of the appropriate approvals for each change will be the most difficult task for change management.
Even though every change management system must be customized to meet the needs of each
organization, there are still a few basic requirements thatmust be met to be effective. These
requirements are:
There must be a single change management system in an organization that meets all
requirements, or a well documented process to dictate which system to use for each type of
change ifmore than one system is required.
The change management system must have a way ofdocumenting all activities surrounding
a change. This will include a description of the change, systems affected, appropriate
approvals, etc.
The change information must be cataloged in away that is easily retrieved and archived.
Most change management systems assign a number to the change for ease of reference,
tracking, and retrieval.
All change informationmust be archived for at least 1 8 months to allow review by internal
and external auditors. Company policy should dictate the exact retention period for this
information.
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The system must enforce the need for adequate testing where applicable. If a change has the
ability to be tested, all test results must be documented and verified before implementation
on a production system can occur.
If required by SOX or other requirements, the change management system must enforce
segregation ofduties. Segregation ofDuties requires that no single individuals will have
control over two or more phases of a transaction or operation. This reduces the likelihood
that fraud may occur because it would require collusion between two or more individuals or
parties [28]. If the design of the change management system is to segregate responsibilities
into set phases, to require a different implementor per phase, and policy dictates that the
change management process is followed, then the change management system will enforce
segregation ofduties.
Appropriate review and approvals for each phase of a change must be required by the
change management system.
Post-implementation review must be required to assure the change was made correctlywith
the desired results.
A sufficient emergency override must be in place to allow change without prior approvals.
This should only be used in cases of extreme emergency, and appropriate approvals and
review must be performed once the emergency situation is corrected.
5.1 Change Management - Personal Recommendation
Using the above information as an outline, I have designed my own change management system
that should work well in any organization. First, I would recommend the use of a single change
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management system. Havingmultiple systems can cause confusion for users when choosing which
system to use and add administrative overhead for maintenance or corrective action when the wrong
system is chosen. Using this single system, there will be options to designate which type of change is
occurring; implementation ofnew code into production, system/database/application infrastructure or
configuration change, testable or non-testable data change, emergency change, etc. Each type of change
will follow a different type of requirement structure. For instance, moving code into production will
require a requestor to request the change, a developer to code the change, a tester to test and verify the
code, and an implementer to put the code into production; all with appropriate levels of approval. A
non-testable system infrastructure changemay only require a requestor to request and verify the change,
management approvals, and an implementer to make the change. For segregation ofduties, the same
person cannot be assigned to more than one of these roles. Also, this is fully customizable to allow for
additional change types and alternative delegation ofduties as required.
The change management system must also track additional information. Having the systems and
applications that the change affects is important for notifications and approvals. A detailed description
of the change itselfmust be included to fully understand the nature of the change prior to approval and
implementation. Also links to related changes or projects will make the information farmore
manageable.
By far, the most difficult task for configuring your change management system will be the
determination of appropriate paths and approvals for each type of change. Certain changes may require
approval by the Business Process Ownerwhere others may not. In which case, who should be the
approver: the users manager, the manager of the system, the subject matter expert, etc? Also, which
types Of changes will require testing, what constitutes as an emergency change, etc must be determined.
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This determinationwill take many hours ofworks, and manymeetings with all affected members to
ferret out a process that best fits requirements and auditing guidelines.
Additionally, as in any organization, people change positions or the organizational structure is
occasionallymodified due to acquisition or restructuring. In these instances, administrative overhead is
required to update user access and approval matrices. An automated solution, like the one discussed in
the total integration section of this document will severely decrease this burden.
6 Account Provisioning and Controls
Controlling access to financial systems is important for reducing risk. This applies to user or
generic accounts since both are potential gateways formalicious activity. By accurately tracking and
limiting these gateways to those required for the organization to function, it will limit the number of
users that can potentially do harm through accessing the system, and limit the number of accounts
available to crack and breach. Therefore any user account on the system must be required to perform
that users job, and any generic account must strictly be required to enable the system or application to
function.
Management for these accounts can be handled in either amanual or automated fashion. Manual
configurations usually consist of a user logging in to each system and making the appropriate changes.
Automated solutions however, like identitymanagement systems, allow remote manage of account
access via SSH, ODBC, etc from a central location. The management systems have connectors used to
authenticate to each system and make appropriate changes in a controlled and auditable fashion, with
zero legwork by the administrators. Therefore this solution is preferred wherever possible.
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6.1 IdentityManagement Systems
Identitymanagement systems play a key role in tracking and controlling account access. These
systems, such as HP Select Identity Software [12], Sun IdentityManagement [10], and Oracle Identity
Management [11] provide the capabilities to provision or revoke accounts and groupings across multiple
systems. They also provide accurate account and group provisioning records, and approval records for
ease of attestations and auditing.
These systems are primarily designed to add or remove accounts from commonly used Operating
Systems, Databases, and Applications. Many of these also provide the ability to expand their list of
system types through the use of custom plug-ins. For instance, if an organization's billing application is
not compatible with their identitymanagement system, they can write custom code to link the two
systems together. This allows organizations to utilize the software products that best suit the business
needs without being limited by their identitymanagement system.
These systems also provide a function called reconciliation. They pull account information from
each system they are connected to and store it in a central repository. At set intervals, they compare the
collected information to verify that the accounts set for creation were in fact created, and that no
additional accounts have been added without its knowledge. This allows the system to verify that
account creation was performed correctly, there were no manual account creations, as well as provides a
central account listing that can be provided to the auditors. This central account listing can also be
useful for the attestation process. At set times, management must review all accounts provisioned on
each in-scope system and attest to their existence or have them removed. The central repositorymakes
account report generation for each system much easier and inmost cases can save the attestation results.
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One may be questioning why this type of system is advantageous overmanually controlling and
reconciling the accounts since the initial configuration of such a system will require an extensive amount
ofwork that could be spent performing the process manually. First, manual processes are harder to
audit and require additional administrative overhead. When an auditor requests a listing of all accounts
on every system, one can simply pull the data from the identitymanagement system instead ofpulling a
user list from every operating system, every database, etc saving the administrators time. All approvals
and attestations for an account's existence can be kept within the identitymanagement system, reducing
the need to search for them. Also, each account created by the identitymanagement system can be
audited in a much easier and fastermanner, and provide reasonable assurance that the account was
provisioned correctly since it was an automated process. There are also advantages when revoking
account privileges. Many times in an organization, accounts that should be disabledmay remain active
for days after the request is submitted. Without a central repository to track account locations, many
accounts that are supposed to be disabled are forgotten and remain active on the system. This allows
employees who no longerwork for the organization to potentially access accounts even after they leave,
or generic accounts to continue to be accessed by employees that used to manage them. Finally, most
identitymanagement systems provide role-based access provisioning, which will be discussed in the
user and generic account subsections.
In addition, user identitymanagement systems can be used to control AD security groups, database
roles, UNIX group membership etc. All of these pieces can be linked to roles and automatically
provisioned as well. If an organization is willing to dedicate the time for system integration and
configuration, these systems can centrally control access throughout the environment and provide a
central location for access auditing.
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6.1.1 User Identity Management
User Identitymanagement is a subset of IdentityManagement since it pertains strictly to the
maintenance ofuser accounts linked to real people. User identitymanagement is the primary reason
why identitymanagement systems were created and takes full advantage of all available functionality. It
is also one of the primary focuses ofmy integrated, automated solution since user initiated activity is
heavily scrutinized during an audit.
The provisioning ofuser and generic account access through an identitymanagement system has
two distinct differences. The first is in regards to revoking access. Many times in an organization, a
user either leaves the company or transfers to a new job role. When a user no longer works for the
company, their access must be revoked environment wide. Also, when an employee transfers job roles,
they should lose any access that is not required by their new position. Many times when this is amanual
process, access removals are not performed in a timelymanner or at all. This allows ex-employees to
retain some level of access, and current employees to maintain additional privileges from previous job
roles called "privilege
creep."
A user identitymanagement system can prevent this in two ways. First,
an administrator can select a user profile and view every account and group that the user currently has
access to. Then make appropriate modifications within a single system, based on that information. If
access is removed, it will be reflected on the user profile and during reconciliation for easy verification.
This prevents the need to log in to each individual system to verify or remove access, and helps
guarantee nothing was missed or performed
incorrectly.
The second way a user identitymanagement system can
fix this problem, and differs from generic
account provisioning, is through the use of roles. An
administrator can create a role for each job type
within an organization. The role will contain all of the access that is required to perform that particular
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job type. For instance, a Database Administrator would require an e-mail account, access to each
database, possible access to each system the database resides on, etc. When a new database
administrator is hired, they are assigned the Database Administration role and all required access would
automatically be provided. If they were to quit, the role would be removed and all of their access would
automatically be revoked. Finally if theywere to transfer, the role would be removed and a new role
would be assigned. The system would automatically delete any access from the first role and
automatically provision all access required for the second role. This method would ensure all access is
appropriately provided per job specification with no privilege creep, no forgotten account removals, and
minimal administrative overhead.
6.1.2 User Identity Management Systems: Application Accounts
Similar to user accounts, application accounts can be maintained by identitymanagement
systems as well. These systems can provision the account, group access, etc required for the account to
function. The distinct difference however is that the application account is not linked to an individual
user but an application that can be accessed bymultiple users. Therefore account provisioning and
revocation is handled in a slightly different fashion.
Since the account would be limited to the type of application, role based provisioning would be
created per the application specs and not the user. For instance, we can create a role called "billing
system."
This role would be assigned all of the application accounts and group access required for the
organizations billing system. When a new billing system is created, the system could be assigned the
"billing
system"
role, and all account and group
permissions would automatically be provisioned per the
role specifications. This would allow all billing systems to conform to the same type of application
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account access, maintaining consistencywithin the environment. When the configuration requires a
change, the role can be updated and automatically applied to all related systems. Also, if an application
is dropped, the application accounts will be removed in a timely fashion, reducing the risk of the account
being exploited.
6.1.3 System Accounts
System accounts are installed by default when the system is built. Therefore these accounts cannot
be added using an identitymanagement system. However, each UNIX distribution will have a
consistent set ofgeneric accounts. All Solaris 8 installs will have consistent accounts, all AIX 6.0, all
HP-UX 1 1.0, etc. This will make justification and attestations for these accounts very easy, and allow
for a simple differentiation between system and application account types.
Since the system accounts are provisioned on install and should not be modified by any user, an
automated system for provisioning is not needed. Additionally, every system account except root is
locked by default and should not require any access except by the system itself. Therefore root is the
only account that must be controlled by a password management and privileged access management
system.
The identitymanagement system however can be utilized for its reconciliation process in these
spaces. Once the systems are built and the identitymanagement system is connected, the identity
management system can help verify that system accounts are nevermodified. This can include account
additions, UID changes, group membership changes, accounts being unlocked, etc. With the identity
management system monitoring these accounts, you can verify to the auditors that the default account
configurations are set and not being modified.
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6.1.4 Identity Management Summation
Identitymanagement systems are very useful for controlling and auditing access for any system
they are connected to. They allow for automated access provisioning and revocation wherever possible.
They also provide a central repository for account information, allowing auditors to review and
management to attest to account access. This provides reassurance to the auditors that all account access
is justifiable and that you are attempting to control the risk in this space.
6.2 Account Access Controls
Not only should account provisioning be controlled, but access to the accounts themselves. The use
ofRSH commands or SSH public key authentication is commonly used to bypass security controls.
Since RSH commands are inherently insecure, the functionality should be disabled at the system level
while implementing security best practices. SSH on the other hand is considered the secure method for
UNIX system connectivity, yet can be manipulated to provide security vulnerabilities. SSH public key
authentication is designed to allow accounts to authenticate without the use of a password. Instead, the
account attempting to authenticate sends its public key to the account it's trying to authenticate to. This
account checks its authorized keys file and grants access if the presented public key is found within this
file. This can be very useful when configuring automated process communication between generic
accounts without a password, however users may use this to bypass controls and gain privileged access.
If the user is able to modify an account's authorized key file or steal the key pairing for an account
already contained within the authorized key file, they could access the account without the need for its
password. Therefore any SSH configuration changes should
be controlled and audited very carefully
through a privileged access management system discussed later in this document.
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7 UNIX File Permissions
Unix file permissions play a very important role in the protection of financial data on UNIX
systems. If file permissions are set incorrectly, it could allow any user with OS level access to modify
key application code or even the data itself. That is why it is very important to set and verify that file
permissions are configured securely. This section will begin with a briefoverview ofUNIX accounts
and file permissions, then demonstrate how proper configuration can protect the stability and integrity of
financial systems.
7.1 UNIX File Permissions Overview
In order to understand UNIX file permissions, one must first understand UNIX users andUNIX
groups. A UNIX user is very simply an account on a UNIX system. Each account can be classified as a
system, application, generic, or user account depending on the account usage. The system however has
no way ofdistinguishing the account type and therefore treats each account the same. A UNLX group is
very simply a group on a UNIX system that contains UNIX user accounts. UNIX users are added to
these groups to gain additional access to files that these groups own.
UNIX systems will only interpret file ownership based offofnumeric values calledUser ID's
(UID) or Group ID's (GID). When a user or group is created, they are assigned a unique UID or GID.
When a file is created, a UID and GID is assigned to that file symbolizing user and group ownership.
These UID and GID ownerships can be mapped back to a corresponding username or group-name by
querying the user and group assignments, typically in /etc/passwd and /etc/group. When a user would
like to view file permissions, the system automatically converts UID's and GID's back to the username
and group name for readability purposes only.
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Now that we understand UNIX users and groups, we can look at the actual permissions set on each
file. Below is an example of standard output received by running the Ts -V command on aUNIX
system.
l-nw-w | |2|matt|staiT|1204O|Aua; 20 1 9% I FinanceRecurd I
r 111 i i 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Each field of this example is broken up as follows. Field 1 is the set ofpermission flags used to
designate read, write, execute, and more advanced file options. Field 2 is the link count and is not
relevant for this discussion. Field 3 is the UNIX user account that owns the file. In this case,
"matt"
owns the file and has permissions designated to him in Field 1. Field 4 is the UNIX group that owns the
file. In this case, all users in the "staff group have access to this file designated by the permissions in
Field 1 . Field 5 is the size of the file in bytes. Field 6 is the date that the file was last modified. Finally
field 7 is the name of the file itself.
Now we can look at field 1 a bit closer to understand how permissions are designated. The main
section of field one can be broken down into four important pieces shown below.
l-irw-jrw-i i
12 3 4
The first section is used to determine the type of file. Typically a "-", "d", or
"1"
will be shown
symbolizing that this is a file, a directory, or a link. The second section is used to designate the file
permissions given to the owner of the file. Typically an "r", "w", or
"x"
will be shown in section 2
symbolizing that the owner can read, write, or execute the file. The
owner can have none, any or all
combinations of these options. If a
"-"
is shown in the space where an "r", "w", or
"x"
would be shown,
that means that owner does not have that permission. The third section is used to designate file
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permissions to a group, or more specifically, all of the users within a group. This sections configuration
is the same as section 1 for read, write and execute permissions, only this time it will allow every user
within the assigned group to have those permissions on the file. So if there are ten users in the staff
group and the current configuration shows "rw-", this would mean that all ten users would have read and
write permissions to the FinanceRecord file. The fourth section is used to designate file permissions to
every user on the system, also known as "world". This sections configuration is the same as section 2
for read, write and execute permissions, only this time it will allow every UNIX user account on the
system to have those permissions to the file. In the example above,"
"
is shown in section 4, providing
no permissions to the world. Therefore only
"matt"
and the users in the staff group have permissions to
this file.
Another piece to controlling UNIX file permissions is through the use of access control lists
(ACL's). ACL's allow for a more granular access control over file permissions than the controls
discussed above, however the control affects complete directories, not just files [31]. Commands and
configurations for ACL's vary for each version ofUNIX and Linux. More information onACL's for
your organizations specific operating system distributions can easily be retrieved through customer
support or an Internet search. I would however recommend against ACL's wherever possible since it
will require additional resources for auditing and administration. Also, with the proper configuration of
UNIX user and group accounts, and a functional privileged access management system that is discussed
later in this document, ACL's should not be needed.
The final piece to controlling UNIX file permissions is the ability to manipulate them to best suit
your organization. One way to do so is through the use ofumasks. Umasks allow users to configure the
default file permission granted to the user, group and world upon file creation. By default, most systems
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will set a umask of '22', which will produce -rw-r--r for regular files and drwxr-xr-x for directories
[31]. However, if this configuration is not acceptable for any reason, you may adjust it by setting your
own umask. This can be done by adding the umask command to the .login, .profile, or .re file of the
account you are trying to control. Options required for the umask command vary by the file settings you
are trying to set in place. For exact specifications, please see the umask man pages.
In addition to the setting ofpermission bits, the owner and group is also assigned during file
creation. Excluding use of the sticky bit, every file or directory that is created will be owned by the user
who created it, and have its group set to the creators primary group. After the file or directory is created,
the file owner and group may be manipulated by the chown and chgrp commands. Also, the file
permissions may be modified, violating the umask settings through the use of the chmod command. For
more information on these commands, please see their correspondingman pages.
7.2 File Sharing
Another piece required to protect UNIX files is the restriction of file sharing. Many applications
require the use of file sharing to allow file access across multiple systems running the same application.
File shares are also used by administrators to make their tools and utilities available environment wide,
or by users for their home directories. The problem with these shares is they create dependencies
between all systems that can access them. If the shares are not properly configured, users can mount
then on systems that are not controlled ormonitored by the organization and manipulate the data. For
instance, if I am aware that all the billing system data is on an unrestricted share and I have network
access, I can plug a UNIX machine that I control into the network,
mount the drive, and manipulate the
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data as I see fit. This can be used to modify code or data, plant a Trojan horse, etc. Therefore file share
control is very important.
When sharing a file system, you are given the option to restrict it as you see fit. You can specify
that the file system is only readable to host A, writable to host B, and that root only has privileged access
on host C. You can also restrict the use of set user ID, preventing users from executing files and gaining
additional privileges. An additional flag commonly used is anon. Anon is used for the interpretation of
anonymous users. When a root account on an external system tries to access the share, the share
interprets the account as nobody or anonymous. By using the flag anon=o, anonymous accounts like
root will be given UID 0 providing them root like access. anon=-l will assign anonymous accounts like
root to UID 1, providing them no privileged access over the share. Below is an example of a secured
file share configuration.
Youmust also be careful whenmounting shared file systems. These file systems may have been
modified to contain Trojan horses or SUED scripts to provide a back door to amalicious user. The
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mounting of file systems also allows for granular control similar to the sharing of file systems. An
administrator can configure a share such that it is mounted read only, mounted read/write, allows for no
SUID, etc. This can limit the amount of risk associated withmounting file shares that contain harmful
material. Below is an example of a secure file mount configuration.
point
)ort/ home
ck mount mount
objfs
swap
hostB
hostA
/tmp ticipf:
/test nfs
7.3 Proper Configuration
Proper configuration ofUNIX file permissions will vary depending on the needs of an
organization or the applications using them. However, for security and compliance purposes, file
permissions should meet these basic criteria.
World permissions should not be used on any security or financially relevant files. There
will always be users on a system (System Administrators, Database Administrators, etc) that
should not have open access to this sensitive information.
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Be sure there is segregation between user, application, and system accounts and account
files. Without the use of a privileged access escalation, a user account should not be able to
affect any files owned by a system or application account. This can be accomplished in
many ways.
o Control group access such that a user is never sharing a group with a system or
application account and vice versa. If this does occur, than any file owned by this
group must only allow for group read access.
o All user, system, and application accounts have proper ownership and group settings.
For instance, the oracle user should own all oracle related files unless technical
restraints dictate otherwise.
o ACL's are configured in such a way that user accounts cannot affect system and
application account files.
o Set UID should not be used unless there is adequate business justification.
o All file shares must be restricted to a minimal set of required systems. These shares
must be documented as a system dependency and audited as such.
o Disable root access and SUDD on all file shares andmounts unless technical
constraints dictate otherwise.
This short list may seem simple, but auditing and correcting a production system with 20 million
files without breaking a thing can be a daunting task. However, ifyou are able to meet these guidelines,
no modifications can be performed without the use of the change management and privileged access
management systems. Therefore every change will be tested, tracked, and auditable, allowing for a
stable system with a low likelihood of fraud.
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8 Password Management
A PasswordManagement System, especially for application and system accounts, can be a critical
piece to controlling user access. Once file permissions are configured to restrict modifications by user
accounts, a usermay resort to switching users or logging directly in as an application or system account
if they know the password. To prevent this activity, one could disable the su binary and direct login
capability to these specific accounts. However this could break automated processes that rely on this
functionality and eliminate the ability to manage these accounts should the privileged access
management system fail. Therefore the most secure way to prevent this problem with the least impact
on the environment is to prevent users from knowing or having unapproved access to account passwords
through a password management system.
A password management system like Cyber-Ark Enterprise Password Vault [31] or Symark's
PowerKeeper [32] is designed to continually change passwords for its configured accounts. The
passwords are set to criteria that the administrator can specify, providing them the ability to enforce
secure passwords that are changed frequently. This will prevent users from guessing or cracking
passwords. The systems also stores the password in a secure manner incase itmust be retrieved in an
emergency situation. Retrievals can be locked down in such away that only specific users may request
specific passwords, and that a designated approver must approve each request. These systems will also
log all password changes and user request/approval activity. This can help verify that an account has not
been compromised or used maliciously during an audit, and that the passwordmanagement system is
functioning properly.
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Cyber-Ark Enterprise Password Vault even offers a CLI that can be used to replace hard coded
passwords in scripts and applications. Once configured, the scripts or applications can request the
password from the CLI. The CLI will securely retrieve the password from the password vault and pass
it back to the script or application without any user interference. This allows the vault to automatically
change passwords at will without affecting production systems since the CLI will automatically provide
the updated password. The lack ofhard coded passwords is also more secure since hackers will be
unable to find and exploit passwords stored on the system.
8.1 Password Request Problems
Even though the passwordmanagement system allows for password retrieval, this activity should
not be used in a UNIX environment unless in a true emergency. A privileged access management
system should be used instead to maintain and audit all privileged account activity. Otherwise, if the
password is retrieved and used, there is no preventative control restricting the user activity, and inmany
cases no detective control allowing auditors to verify the work that was performed.
There are a few instances where password retrieval may be necessary. For UNIX administrators,
there are certain instances where theymust become the root user. Typically this is required for system
patching or other activities performed in single user mode. In these cases, using the root account should
only be allowed through the system console since most consoles allow for logging of all activity.
Therefore the users actions can be tracked and audited. The only other instance where the password
may be required is if the privileged access management
system fails. This should be a very rare
occurrence, in which case emergency access should be
available ifneeded, and the risk would be
acceptable if an account were used.
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If the risk is not acceptable or you find that passwords are frequently being retrieved despite a
functional privileged access management system, you can purchase a product like Centrify Direct Audit
[8]. CentrifyDirect Audit allows for full key logging of all account activity. This allows you to
maintain an audit trail even when the account password is used. However, it will add additional
administrative overhead and an additional system to audit. I would therefore recommend using a
privileged access management system that allows users to perform all activity required so that the
passwordwill never be needed.
9 Privileged Access Management
Privileged access management is crucial to the protection of financial information. Administrators
and support personnel will require access to generic accounts in order to perform their job functions.
Since the UNIX file permissions are locked down and users do not have the password to accounts other
than their own, theymust use a privileged access management system. By choosing and properly
configuring a privileged access management system, an organization can have full control over their
employee's access and have an accurate audit record of their actions.
I have found four commonly used privileged access management systems for the UNIX
environment, each discussed below.
9.1 Symark PowerBroker
Symark PowerBroker [27] is an extremely powerful privileged access management system for both
UNIX and Linux operating systems. It allows for a very
granular access control over root and other
privileged accounts that could affect financial data. This control can prevent or allow access to
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programs, applications, files, or directories [27]. It can restrict access by date, day, and even time, as
well as access on a host-by-host basis [27]. It even allows administrators to restrict or replace specific
commands, such as su or r-commands (rsh, rlogin, rep, etc) [27].
Powerbroker provides a central management system that allows remote configuration across
twenty-five UNIX and Linux distributions [27]. This central management system allows for complete
administration over all privileged access configurations in a secure manner using AES encryption. The
central management system is also used to collect full keystroke logging of all privileged access activity,
including logs of all modifications and output.
Essentially with powerbroker fully configured, you can designate that the user
"matt"
has access
as
"root"
to only run the passwd command, from 3pm to 4pm everyMonday on a single server. Or
Database Administrators have full access to the oracle account, 24 hours a day 7 days a week on every
production server. Every bit of activity performed by these users is then collected and available for
review by the auditors.
PowerBroker is an exceptional tool ifyou are willing to pay the price for it. At the time of
writing this paper, I requested a quote from Symark for the administrative console, licenses for 100
servers, and 1 year of support. The quote came to approximately $300,000 dollars with an additional
$100,000 dollar annual support charge. Also since Powerbroker is proprietary software, the source code
is not unavailable and anymodifications would require the use ofprofessional services at an additional
cost.
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9.2 Role Based Access Control (RBAC)
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is amethod supported by Sun Solaris and otherUNIX/Linux
distributions for controlling privileged access on individual systems. It allows for granular access
controls to specific files and programs, as well as auditing capability through the systems local logging
facilities. Additionally, it is open source software so there is no cost associated with its use.
RBAC consists of three elements: the role, the authorization, and the rights profile. The role is a
special identity that can be assumed by its assigned users [34]. The authorization is permissions
assigned to a role in order to execute commands outlined in the rights profile. The rights profile is the
set of commands and security attributes that users may execute. These three components together allow
the administrators to granularly assign permissions. For instance, you can create a role containing all of
the members of the Database Administration group, create a rights profile that allows execution of all
commands, and create an authorization such that the DBA role can access the oracle account. All
together, it would allow all Database administrators to execute any command as the oracle account.
Although this does support the idea of "least
privileges,"
the administration and auditing of
RBAC is fairly difficult in comparison to its alternatives. It is also more difficult to manage since it
does not provide a central management system for configurations.
9.3 Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) is very similar to RBAC in that it is a free, effective method to
control privileged access in the UNIX environment. Like RBAC, it provides granular access controlled
via local configuration files. However unlike RBAC, MAC uses the concept of labels and policies. A
label is a security attribute that can be applied to
objects throughout the system [35]. A policy is a
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collection of rules that will control the flow of, and define who will have access to the data and
information [35]. Labels are attached to files on the system, containing a listing ofone ormore policies.
When a user tries to access a file that is labeled, the label will check the policy listing and grant access
based on what is defined in the policy.
Policies can be updated to provide additional or restrict currently allocated privileged access fairly
easily. However, if a new policy is created, each label that will utilize the new policymust be updated.
This can be an administrative nightmare depending on the number of labels being used throughout the
system. Although, this does provide granular access, the administrative overhead to maintain the labels
on each file seems far greater than that required by its alternatives such as SUDO or PowerBroker.
9.4 SUDO
SUDO [6] is yet another privileged access management system for the UNIX/Linux environments.
Since SUDO is open source software and the code is available online, you can freely compile and
deploy it to anyUNIX/Linux based environment, includingMacintosh computers. Also, the code can be
modified to allow for integration with other systems. Specific details of this will be discussed in the
integration section of this document.
SUDO has two components; the sudo binary usually found in /usr/local/bin, and the sudoers
configuration file usually found in /etc. The SUDO binary allows for granular access control as
specified in the sudoers configuration file, as well as password verification and caching for additional
securitymeasures. This ensures that a usermust know their own account password before obtaining
privileged access, preventing amalicious bystander from executing SUDO commands as other users.
SUDO has mailing capabilities, using the hosts SMTP configuration to alert administrators of
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unapproved activities. It also provides an audit trail of all activity through the systems local logging
facility.
The sudoers configuration file was designed in such away to allow administrators complete control
over the privileges provided to its users. To aid in the configuration, the designers built in the ability to
use aliases and keywords to help keep things organized. Below, I have listed the aliases and keywords
commonly used with a briefdescription.
Host Alias - A host alias is a listing ofone or more hosts used to grant or revoke access to
the hosts listed. This can be useful when only granting user access to a single system, even
though the same sudoers configuration file is used environment wide.
User Alias - A user alias is a listing ofuser accounts to assign privileged access to. This
allows administrators to create a user alias like DBA, and assign all Database Administrators
to it. Then they could assign privileges to the DBA alias, instead of each individual user.
Note: using the special character %, a user alias can be replaced by the name of aUNIX
group. All members of the UNIX group would then be granted the privileges specified.
This allows for easy configuration since updating UNIX groups is standard practice for
adding and removing users, where updating the sudoers configuration may not be.
Runas Alias - A runas alias is a listing ofprivileged accounts that may be accessed by a user
or user alias. This allows an administrator to create a runas alias containing all accounts
utilized by the DBA's, then assign access to this alias instead of creating a new assignment
for each privileged account.
Command Alias - A command alias is a listing of commands that can be granted or revoked
from an account.
Masters Thesis Page 40 5/22/2008
ALL - The ALL keyword specifies that a user be allowed all possible access. ALL can be
used in place of any alias type.
NOPASSWD/PASSWD - This keyword will control whether a user is prompted for their
own password when executing SUDO. It is recommended to use the PASSWD keyword for
added security.
NOEXEC/EXEC - Certain commands like vi, view, less, more, etc allow for shell escapes.
These escapes allow for unmonitored privileged access to the system and therefore must be
restricted wherever possible. Using these keywords, you can control whether programs
executed through SUDO will allow for additional execution from within them, allowing the
prevention of executing a shell escape within SUDO spawned processes.
NOSETENV/SETENV - Certain scripts and commands require specially configured
environmental variables. Typically, an account has these variables configured in its .login,
.profile,
or .re files. By using this keyword, it will allow users to access these accounts to
source their environmental variables before the execution of the requested command.
Using these components, one could easily configure specific access for any user or group, for any
system, for any command. However, SUDO does have two noteworthy drawbacks. The first is that it
does not provide a central management system. Each configuration file is locally configured. This can
however be overcome by using one single configuration file environment wide and implementing a
system formass deployment, or by using the methodology I will discuss in the integration section of this
document. The second drawback, which cannot be overcome without major code modifications, is the
lack of fine grain keystroke auditing. SUDO logs all executed commands but does not track any
command output or modifications made within the executed process. For instance, the execution of
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/usr/local/bin/sudo /usr/bin/vi /etc/passwd will be logged, but anymodifications made to the password
file after execution would not.
10 Logging and Reporting
Logging and Reporting systems are a critical piece to passing a Sarbanes-Oxley audit and ensuring
the integrity of financial data. Even though preventative controls are in place to control password
management and privileged access, these systems may be used formalicious intent. Auditorsmust then
rely on detective controls such as log reviews to verify these systems are being used appropriately.
Each system discussed throughout this paper has had logging capabilities for user-initiated
activities. However, many of these systems store their logs in distinct locations and lack reporting
capabilities to sort and deliver logs to appropriate levels ofmanagement for review. This is where a
central logging and reporting system comes in. These systems are designed to collect logs from each
assigned location for archival and storage in a central repository. This allows a central location for log
retrieval, and a safe and secure storage area incase a system is lost or compromised. Many also contain
custom reporting capabilities for the collected logs.
Products such as AdisconsMonitorware [36], PrismMicrosystems Event LogManagement [37],
ManageEngines Eventlog Analyzer [38], and RSA's enVision all provide this functionality [14]. They
serve as a central log repository formultiple device types, as well as powerful reporting engines for log
analysis and review. Some, like RSA's enVision, even allow for complete system customization such as
modifying table structures for the log repositories and updating log parsing code to recognize new
devices that the system originally did not support. This allows an organization additional flexibility
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when choosing various systems since the log management system is potentially compatible providing
the organization is willing to allocate resources to update the log parser.
Once the logs are centrally collected, reports must be generated for the appropriate levels of
management. With the powerful reporting engines provided by these systems, it is easy to generate
custom reports for any collected data. Some systems even provide e-mail capabilities to automatically
send reports to specified users on a scheduled basis. The only difficulty comes from deciding what type
of reports to generate, and whom they should go to.
Typically, auditors would like the following reports generated and reviewed on a consistent basis
for the UNIX environment:
UNIX Direct Logins - Who logged into the system?
UNIX SU Activity
- Once a user is authenticated, did they become another user?
UNIX Privileged Access - Were the activities performed using privileged access
acceptable?
UNIX Failed Login Attempts - Were there a considerable amount of failed login attempts?
If so, is this acceptable due to application error or testing, or was the account being hacked?
UNIX System Shut Downs, Reboots, and Start Ups
- Was the system brought down? If so,
was it during a scheduled maintenance or unexpected?
UNIX Syslog Activity
- Is there any additional syslog activity that your organization feels
relevant?
Once these reports are generated, they should be sent to the appropriate levels ofmanagement for
review. The appropriate management responsible for the log review is left up to the organization.
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Typically however, the reports will go to the subjectmatter expert (Technical Owner) of the system
where the activity occurred, or to the manager of the user performing the actions.
The subject matter expert reports are easy to create and distribute since it requires configuration for
a single person. That person howeverwill become extremely overwhelmed with the amount ofwork
required, especially in a large environment. Also if the subjectmatter expert changes, it will require a
re-configuration of these reports.
The individual manager reports, although a better option to reduce the load on a single person and
allowmanagers to track their people, can be extremely difficult to configure and maintain. This would
require an individual report for eachmanager, configured with a listing of each employee that they
manage. If a manager or an employee's status changes, it would require a manual re-configuration of
the report, unless there is a method to 'automate this process. This method will be discussed in the Total
Integration section of this document
After review, the reports must then be signed and dated. This will allow the auditors to verify that
the activity is being reviewed in a timelymanner. Finally, the logs and signed reports must be archived
and retained for no shorter than your organizations log retention policy. Any type of secure, long term
storage solution should be sufficient, providing that the information is accessible in a timelymanner if
required. Please be advised however that depending on the number of systems being logged and the
retention timeframe, this may require multiple terabytes of storage space.
11 Total Integration
Each system discussed in this document plays a key role in the protection of financial data. Most of
which even provide automated components to improve efficiency. Despite this fact, the continual
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maintenance of these systems would require a considerable amount of time and administrative support.
By integrating each of these solutions, we can utilize the automated components and some additional
code to allow each system to control each other. This will allow a change in one system to propagate,
eliminating the need to perform multiple updates and reducing the time andmoney spent on
maintenance and auditing. This integrated solution is also scalable to meet growing business needs, and
versatile enough to work inmost organizational structures.
The following sections will discuss amethod for this integration, assuming that a version of each of
the above-mentioned system have been purchased and installed.
11.1 User Identity Management/Password Management Integration
User identitymanagement systems are designed to control user access in an approved and audited
fashion. Passwordmanagement systems are designed to maintain passwords on each system, preventing
user from knowing the password unless requested and approved. Even though password retrievals must
be approved, there must be a system in place to prevent users from retrieving passwords they should not
have access to, regardless of approvals. Most password management systems provide this functionality
but configuration and maintenance can be burdensome. That is why the passwordmanagement system
should be integrated to the user identitymanagement system. The identitymanagement system could
assign retrieval rights to only the accounts required by a users job role. In this case, when a user is hired
or changes positions, they will automatically gain or loss retrieval rights to specified account passwords
without anymanual configuration changes to the password management system.
The actual integration of these two systems depends on the systems your organization chooses to
use. For security purposes, most passwordmanagement systems restrict external configurations. This
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may require customized code to override this feature. However, be sure that this override and
integration is in a secure, encrypted fashion to avoid security breaches.
11.2 User Identity Management/Change Management Integration
User identitymanagement systems are designed to control user access in an approved and audited
fashion. Change management systems are designed to track all user-initiated changes in the
environment, along with all appropriate approvals. Permissions for change management systems are
typically controlled by an administrator. This requires manual configuration changes whenever a user is
added or changes positions since theymust be given appropriate access rights to view, submit, and
approve change requests based on their job functions. This is yet another area that the user identity
management system can maintain. By integrating these two systems, the user identitymanagement
system can control all change management access rights via preconfigured roles per job specification.
Now if a user is hired or changes position, the system will automatically assign them a role based on
their position and provide them appropriate access to the change management system.
Again, the actual integration of these two systems depends on the systems your organization
chooses to use. If the capabilities are not available, specialized code may be required. Please be sure
however that this integration is performed in a secure, encrypted fashion to avoid security breaches or
privilege escalations.
11.3 Change Management/Password Management Integration
Change management systems are designed to track all user-initiated changes in the environment,
along with all appropriate approvals. Passwordmanagement systems are designed to maintain
passwords on each system, preventing users from knowing the password unless requested and approved.
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If the scenario arose where a usermust perform a change and requires the account password, that user
must log into the change management system and submit all of the appropriate information for approval,
then log into the password management system to request the password. This would require twice as
much work for the user, twice as much work formanagement having to approve both requests, and
twice as much work for an auditor having to audit both requests and approvals. Instead, the change
management system should be modified to allow a password request option. This option would allow
the user submitting the request to enter in the username, system, and account type for the password they
require. Once management has reviewed the request and approved the change, the approval would
automatically be forwarded to the password management system. The user can then retrieve the
password from the passwordmanagement system and perform the maintenance. Now only one request
and one approval are required, and there is one single place to audit since the request and approval is
handled by the change management system.
Methods to perform this type of integration will vary depending on the type of change
management system and password management system used. If the password management system
allows for approval by external applications, then this integrationmay only require a simple plug-in.
Otherwise specially designed code, or the use ofCLImay be required, allowing the changemanagement
system to retrieve the password. Be especially careful however ifyou choose this option. The password
management systems are designed to be extremely secure. If you bypass their security, be sure that the
method used is also secure. This includes encrypted traffic for all approval transfers, password requests,
and encrypted password storage.
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11.4 Change Management/Privileged Access Management Integration
Changemanagement systems are designed to track all user-initiated changes in the environment,
along with all appropriate approvals. Privileged access management systems are designed to allow users
to perform changes in a controlled and audited fashion. Even though privileged access management
systems can restrict users per command, system, account, etc, there is very little preventative control to
enforce receiving an approval before performing an action. By integrating these two systems, you can
enforce this type of control.
I recommend SUDO as a privileged access management system because the following
modifications can easily be made to the SUDO source code that is publicly available. However, any
system that allows for these modifications is perfectly acceptable.
As discussed in the Change Management section of this document, all change requests should be
linked to a primary identifier, typically a ticket number. Therefore the first step is to modify your
privileged access management system to allow a ticket number to be included with the execution of each
command. Doing so will allow for easy correlation between the command being executed, and the
associated approved change ticket. Using the entered ticket number, the system can then query the
change management system for the ticket's relevant information listed below.
1 . All users that are designated to perform operations for the ticket.
2. All hosts that the ticket can affect.
3. The ticket status. Is the ticket approved, pending approval, closed, or denied?
When a user executes a command, that users username and the hostname are automatically pulled into
the system. With this acquired ticket information, you canmake a comparison to verify that the
information is valid. The users username will be compared to all users designated to perform operations
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for the entered ticket. If the username is found, the hostname is then compared to verify that the host is
specified in the ticket. If the host is found, then the status of the ticket is then compared. If the ticket is
not in an approved state, or if any of these comparisons fail, then the system will report that the ticket
number is invalid. This will ensure that the changemanagement system is being used for all changes,
the information entered into the change management system is correct, and that the user has the
appropriate approvals to perform the change.
To improve performance for this process, after a ticket has been verified as acceptable for use, it
should be cached. This will allow additional commands to be executed without the performance
degradation on your change management and privileged access management systems during
verification. Be sure however that the cache time is not considerably long fore users may use this as a
means to surpass the system by entering a single valid ticket number and then use it to perform multiple
unrelated changes. I would recommend limiting the cache time to approximately five to tenminutes.
Additionally, some commands requiring privileged access may not perform anymodifications at
all. Users may require these commands, such as Is or cat for troubleshooting and verification. In this
case, managerial approval for executionmay not be required as long as the user has appropriate
permissions configured in the privileged access system. A ticket requirement override should therefore
be set in place for these commands. This would require the collection of read-only commands used by
groups within the organization, and having exceptions for those commands assigned to the designated
groups. These exceptions will not only improve user and system performance since ticket validation
would not be required for commands that could pose no adverse affect to the system, but it will also
increase user acceptance since it is less hindrance to performing their jobs.
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Another advantage to having the change management and privileged access management
systems integrated is that you can automatically document most changes being made for the specified
ticket. With little effort, you could have all logs forwarded and attached to the corresponding ticket in
the change management system. This could be performed in multiple ways. You couldmodify the
privileged access management system such that it automatically forwards all activity. This would
require modifications similar to the verification procedure since the systems themselves would be
linked. You could modify the logging facilities to forward the logs to a named pipe for additional
processing. This solution will be discussed in more detail under the Privileged Access
Management/Logging & Reporting Section. Or you could set up a cron on the system that will process
and attach the logs at times when the systems are known to experience a lighter load. Any of these
implementations would serve the same purpose, allowing all privileged activity to be tracked by the
change management system and provide a single point for auditing changes and privileged access.
11.5 Privileges Access Management/Logging & Reporting Integration
Privileged access management systems are designed to allow users to perform changes in a
controlled and audited fashion. Logging & Reporting systems are designed to collect and retain these
and other logs, and generate reports on the collected data. Integrating the two systems is extremely easy
in theirmost basic form. Most can pass the logging information via an addition to the syslog.conf file
on the UNIX systems. If the privileged access management system stores their logs within its own
database, the logging system can most likely retrieve these logs via an ODBC connection.
Even though the integration of these two systems is seamless, this basic integrationwill require an
excessive amount of administrative overhead formaintaining the reporting engine. The reporting
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engines rely on administrative configurations for each report generated. This requires an administrator
to continually create new, or update existing reports as organizational structures change or as employees
enter or leave the organization. However with a few custom modifications, we can nearly eliminate this
overhead.
Almost every organization seeking SOX compliance has some type ofdocumented organizational
structure, typically contained withinMicrosoft's Active Directory or another LDAP based system.
Knowing this, we can configure a process that will query the organizational structure for relevant
information and attach it to the logs before they are sent to the logging system. These attachments can
be performed in real time and allow for automated report generation.
Privileged access management systems such as SUDO have some method for logging user
activity. If this logging method is through the local systems syslogd, then it is extremely easy to make
these additions. First, create a named pipe on the system. This pipe will appear to be a file to the
system and allow for inter-process communication. Then configure the syslog.conf to send all
privileged access logs to this named pipe. On the other side of the named pipe, you must create a query
process. This process will read in log messages from the named pipe and interpret andmanipulate as
you see fit. For instance, SUDO logs have three priorities; notice, alert, and warning. Warning
messages are not associated with user accounts and therefore should be interpreted differently than
notice and alert messages. For the notice and alert messages, you can easily parse the username of the
user who initiated the command. Using this username, you can run an LDAP query against your
directory structure for any pertinent information (manager e-mail address, department, user e-mail
address, etc) that you would like attached to the logs.
Then you can append the information, restructure
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the log format if required, and push it back through the syslogd under a different facility for additional
processing.
For instance, here is an example of a syslog configuration for this process.
fr m];w
-PuTTY
|#ident "@ (#) syslog.conf 1.5 98/12/14 SHI" /* SgnOS
# Copyright (c)
1991- 19yt: by Sun Microsystems, Inc
# All rights reserved.
m This file is processed by rn4 l. ._ _ ..-.,.
'
that match m4 reserved words.
Alr~
jff containing commas must be quoted.
\#
I*
. err; kern. notice; auth. notice
*. err; kern. debug; daemon. not ice;mail . cr it
j*
. alert; kern. err; daemon. err
I*
. alert
{*
.emerg
r
# local 1 sending all sudo logs to named pipe
locall . debug
i l* 1 .-..-.<=. T ~J t~ d b- i -, t-4 1 i~. i-i.^t -t= v- ,-,rrt i-i ante* r\ r. i ri o = t* i-i >- i vi r
QPpV=f ,11
/ trnp/ .;
;iti locally and
/var/ log/ sudo
In this example, the privileged access management system is configured to use the locall facility for its
logging. All locall logs are sent to the named pipe process where the required information is appended,
then the logs are pushed back through the syslogd under the local2 facility. All local2 logs are then
pushed out to the logging system. This may seem like it will take a significant amount of system
resources to perform. However, privileged access commands are user initiated and therefore are not as
frequent as automated processes. With an additional cachingmechanism for the data the named pipe
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retrieves, the overhead will be minimal. However avoidmaintaining the cache formore than a day or
two. If the cache is stored for a significant amount of time and the user transfers or is assigned a new
manager, this process may not receive the updated information until the cache is cleared.
If the privileged access management system does not use the syslogd, codemodifications to the
systemmay be needed in order to add this functionality. Depending on the privileged access
management system, itmay be easier to add this functionality to the logging system as the logs are
collected. This may however drastically affect log collection and processing since it will rely on the
single logging system to append data to the logs instead of the multiple systems where the activity is
occurring.
Now thatwe have expanded the information provided in the logs, how does this help with
reporting? Instead ofgenerating a report for eachmanager andmaintaining a list of all of their
employees, we can rely on the system that is already designed and maintained to do so. The logging
information being collected already has all the information we require. By attaching the managers e-
mail address to the logs, we can set up a report that generates a distinct listing ofmanager e-mail
addresses over a designated time frame. We then generate and e-mail a report to each of thematching
manager e-mail addresses, containing all logs that have that managers e-mail address attached.
Therefore, if a user changes positions or a new manager is hired, the organizational structure will be
updated, changing the information attached to the logs, and changing the reports being generated. This
reduces the administrative overhead bymore than half since the organizational system is the only thing
that must be manuallymaintained. It also provides more reliability since there is no chance that the
organizational systems and reporting systems informationwill be inconsistent.
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11.6 User Identity Management/Privileges Access Management
User identitymanagement systems are designed to control user access in an approved and audited
fashion. Privileged access management systems are designed to allow users to perform change in a
controlled and audited fashion. Standard configurations for the privileged access management systems
are typically performed by an administrator and can take a significant amount of time. But if there is a
system already in place to manage user access, why not use it to control privileged access provisioning
as well?
As stated under the privileged access management section of this document, many privileged
access management systems can utilize group access for user assignments. For instance, we can create a
UNIX group called dba on the local system and add all members of the Database Administration team to
the group. Then configure the privileged access management system to allow all members of the dba
group to have privileged access over all generic accounts they are required to maintain. In this case, all
privileged access is still managed by the privileged access management system, yet who can obtain this
access is controlled bymembership to the UNIX group. The same principle applies to Active Directory
security groups if the privileged access management system cannot use UNIX group access.
Most user identitymanagement systems are capable ofcontrolling group access and therefore can
control access to privileged accounts. By configuring the privileged access management system to use
group access, and configuring the identitymanagement system to control these groups, you can
therefore control user privileged access through the identitymanagement system. Now you can create a
DBA role in the identitymanagement system that will automatically create a new database administrator
their system account access and assign all privileged access they require. This drastically reduces the
administrative efforts required to maintain the privileged access management system since the creation
Masters Thesis Page 54 5/22/2008
of a new generic account would be the only time it would require manual configurations. This happens
far less often than user accountmodifications so it is a significant improvement.
11.7 User Identity Management/Active Directory Integration
In some cases, the user identitymanagement solution may not be capable of controlling UNLX
accounts and groups. Most however are capable of controlling common systems like Active Directory.
In this case, you can still use the identitymanagement system to control access to a UNIX environment.
Through the use ofproduct like CentrifyDirect Control [8] or Vintela Authentication Services [9], you
can link Active Directory users and security groups to UNIX users and groups. This link works by
creating a direct correlationwithin Direct Control or Authentication Services between a UNIX username
or groupname and an Active DirectoryUser or group. In this way, any change to AD will affect the
UNIX system. If the AD user is disabled, the UNIX account will be disabled as well. If an AD group
has users added or removed, than the UNIX group also has those users added or removed. User
password authentication is also linked providing the ability to enforce a more secure password than the
standard UNIX system would allow. With these links in place, it would allow the user identity
management system to manage AD users and security groups, which would automatically affect the
corresponding UNIX users and groups, which could then affect access through the privileged access
management system.
Be very careful however ifyou choose to use this solution. In the case that Direct Control or
Authentication Services break, users would lose all access to the system. If system or application
accounts are also provisioned in this fashion, it could break the applications utilizing these accounts and
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drastically affect the business. Therefore I would recommend only provisioning user accounts in this
fashion if you choose to use this solution.
11.8 FinalWorkflows
Now that the integration of these systems is complete, I will now step you through a final workflow
demonstrating how the system works with no administrative interference.
11.8.1 Access Grants/Removals
The department responsible for job role assignments, typically human resources, should initialize all
access grants and removals. This department enters the appropriate information (name, job title,
manager, etc) into the user identitymanagement system. Based on this information, the identity
management system will automatically act accordingly.
If the information submitted is for a new user to the organization, the user identity
management system will provision all account and group access required. Depending on the
job title, these may include UNIX accounts, UNIX group access, change management
access, password management access, AD security groups, Database Access, etc. Once
complete, the user should not require any additional access unless otherwise requested and
approved.
If the information submitted is for an employee that is leaving the organization, all access is
automatically disabled or removed.
If the information submitted is for a user who is changing job roles, all access require for the
previous job role is disabled or revoked. Then all access required for the new role is
provisioned.
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11.8.2 User Initiated Changes
When a user would like to initialize a change, they must use the change management system to
receive approval. Once received, they may perform the change by retrieving the account password or
using the privileged access management system. The following two sections will discuss this in more
detail.
11.8.2.1 With Account Passwords
When a user requests a change in the change management system, they have the option of
requesting the account password. If approved, the user could retrieve the password from the password
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management system. The user could then access the account directly without the need for the privileged
access management system. This however allows the user to have complete, potentially un-audited
control over the account. It would be the users responsibility to maintain their own audit log within the
change management system for auditing purposes. This however is unreliable since a user performing
malicious actions would most likely not document them. I would therefore not recommend approving a
password request unless there is an extreme emergency, the privileged access management system is not
functioning correctly, or there is a technical constraint that requires the password.
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Password Modified Once
Charsge Is Complete
-User Pulls Approve d Password
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Management Receives
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1 1 .8.2.2 Without Account Passwords
When a user would like to initiate a change, theymust first submit the change information in the
change management system. If approved bymanagement, the user can then log in to the system and use
the privileged access management system to perform the change. The privileged access management
system will verify the user has appropriate approvals by querying the changemanagement system for
the ticket number input by the user. Ifproperly verified, the privileged access management system will
allow the change to take affect. All change activities are then processed through the named pipe
function, which queries the organizations employee directory structure and appends the information to
the activity log. The log is then sent to the change management system and attached to the change
ticket, as well as sent to the logging and reporting engine. At certain times, the reporting engine will
generate reports and send them to management for review. The logs are then retained in a long-term
storage device for no less than the time designated in the organizations retention policy.
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12 System Demonstration
This section will show a basic demonstration of the integrated solution. For this demonstration,
please assume that an identitymanagement system is in place and has automatically configured all of the
access required. Also, that the change management system is in place and populated with change
requests.
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12.1 Change Management Configurations
Shown below is a dump of four change management tickets used for this demonstration. For
simplicity, the information has been filtered to the fourmajor fields required to obtain privileged access
on a UNIX system (Ticket #, ImplementationUser, Hosts Affected, and Ticket Status). The ticket # is
the number used by the change management system as a primary key for the change. The
Implementation Users are the users specified in the ticket that should be performing the required change.
The Hosts Affected are the hosts on which the change should be occurring. The status is the state that
the ticket in. Is the ticket "pending
approval,""approved," "closed,"
etc?
Ticket #: 0
Implementation Users: ypan
Hosts Affected: jars-desktop
Ticket Status: approved
Ticket #: 1
Implementation Users: mbahrenburg
Hosts Affected: matt-desktop
Ticket Status: approved
Ticket #: 2
Implementation Users: mbahrenburg
Hosts Affected: jars-desktop
Ticket Status: closed
Ticket #: 3
Implementation Users: mbahrenburg
Hosts Affected: jars-desktop
Ticket Status: approved
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12.2 UNIX Privileged Access linked to Change Management
This section will demonstrate how linking the UNIX privileged access system SUDO to a change
management system can limit risk in your environment. With this link in place, no modifications can be
made without being specified and approved in the change management system. For this to work, the
SUDO binary has been modified to require the input of a ticket number for each command. This ticket
number is then queried against the change management system to ensure the change is appropriate.
'l-atittlmA
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help
mbahrenburg@j a rs -desktop :-S sudo Is
You must supply a ticket number using the -t option to obtain privileged access
mbahrenburgdj a
rs-
desktop :~$ |
Screenshot showing that a ticket number is required to execute any privileged commands.
Ol ' "-- "tztimUiul ~ -jgcHl B
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help
mbahrenburg(3jars-desktop:~S sudo -t 5 Is
Ticket number specified (5) is not valid in change management system.
mbahrenburg(Bjars-desktop:~$ []
Screenshot showing that a valid ticket number in the change management systemmust be entered to
obtain privileged access. Ifyou look at the available ticket numbers specified in section 12.1, ticket # 5
is not a valid choice.
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'Inttuhmi
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help
mbahrenburgjij a
rs-
desktop :~$ id
uid=10Gl(mbahrenburg) gid=1001(mbahrenburg) groups=110(admin) , 1001(mbahirenburg)
mbahrenburggj ars -desktop :-$ sudo -t 0 Is
Ticket specified (0) does not contain username(nibahrenburg) .
mbahrenburg(ajars-desktop:~s [|
Screenshot showing that the system usermust match the implementation user for the specified ticket. In
this example, ticket # 0 has ypan as the ImplementationUser, yetmbahrenburg is attempting to use that
ticket. As you can see, mbahrenburg's attempt has failed.
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help
mbahrenburg@j a
rs-
desktop :~S hostname
jars-desktop
mbahrenburg(3jars-desktop:~$ sudo -t 1 Is
Ticket specified!!) does not contain this hostt jars-desktop)
mbahrenburgfaj ars-desktop:~$ [j
Screenshot showing that the system hostnamemust match the Affected Hosts for the specified ticket. In
this example, ticket # 1 has matt-desktop as the Affected Host, yet the change is being attempted on jars-
desktop. As you can see, this attempt has failed.
iSaimhmk
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help
mbahrenburgij a rs -desktop ;~$ sudo -t 2 Is
Ticket specified(2) is closed or not yet approved.
mbah renburg@j a
rs-desktop :-$ [j
Screenshot showing that the specified ticket must be approved prior to implementing a change. In this
example, ticket # 2 has been closed and therefore no additional changes can be made using this ticket.
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: y 'lzttm\ni\\ o ||S | '<>i
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help
iubahrenburg@ja
rs-
desktop :-$ hostname
jars-desktop
mbahrenburg@jars-desktop:~$ id
uid=1001(mbahrenburg) gid=1001 (mbahrenburg) groups=110(admin) , lO01(mbahrenburg)
mbahrenburg(crj a
rs-
desktop :~3 sudo -t 3 Is
dead. letter Documents Pictures sudo-1.6.8pl2.checkmod Templates
Desktop J-lusic Public sudo.paetec.checkmod.zip Videos
mbahrenburg(ajairs-desktop:~$ []
Screenshot showing a valid execution ofprivileged access. In this example, ticket # 3 is a valid ticket,
has mbahrenburg specified as the ImplementationUser, has jars-desktop specified as the Affected Host,
and is in the approved status. Therefore the user is able to obtain privileged access required for the
specified ticket.
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12.3 Active Directory Configuration
This section contains a basic overview of the Active Directory configurations used for this
demonstration.
4$Active Directory Users and Computers
* File Action View
<P - [ ] OS j jd
Window Help
BIX fi?^
-jffixl
I rf m
!
Jfc s$ v *
Active Directory Users and Computer
i "I Saved Queries
tfp thesis.rit.edu
ffl Q Builtin
B LJ Computers
EI U] Domain Controllers
l~"l Foreign5ecurityPrincipals
{^ Users
Name
C AD Query
C Administrator
{$Cert Publishers
0 Daryl Johnson
CiDnsAdmins
$DnsUpdateProxy
EiDomain Admins
fjiDomain Computers
fjiDomain Controllers
JjiDomain Guests
{#Domain Users
fjiEnterprise Admins
{JiGroup Policy Creator Owners
IGuest
JJ2HelpServicesGroup
C Matthew Bahrenburg
C Peter Lutz
22rA5 and IAS Servers
yiSchema Admins
fJSUPPORT_388945aO
f^TelnetClients
Description
User
User
Security Group .
User
Security Group ,
5ecurity Group .
Security Group .
Security Group .
Security Group .
Security Group .
Security Group .
Security Group .
Security Group ,
User
Security Group .
User
User
Security Group ,
Security Group ,
User
Security Group .
Built-in account for admini. ,
Members of this group are..
DNS Administrators Group
DNS clients who are permi..
Designated administrators. .
All workstations and serve. ,
All domain controllers in th. .
All domain guests
All domain users
Designated administrators.,
Members in this group can, ,
Built-in account for guest . .
Group for the Help and Su. .
Servers in this group can . .
Designated administrators.
This is a vendor's account .
Members of this group ha.
Above is a screenshot containing the listing ofUsers in the Users OU ofmy test Active Directory
system. Notice thatMatthew Bahrenburg, Yin Pan, Daryl Johnson, and Peter Lutz have been added as
users in the Domain.
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Matthew Bahrenburg Properties JJx]
Member Of Dial-in Environment I Sessions
Remote control Terminal Services Profile C0M+
General ] Address j Account j Profile j Telephones Organization
Title:
Department:
Company.
Manager
Name: [Yin Pan
Change.. Properties Clear
Direct reports:
OK Cancel
Above is a screenshot of Matthew Bahrenburg's Organization AD properties. Notice that his Manager is set to
Yin Pan.
Yin Pan Properties J?J*i
Member Of j
Remote control
General Address
C Yin Pan
Dial-in Environment j
Terminal Services Profile j
j Account j Profile ] Telephones
Sessions
COM+
j Organization
First name: IflB Initials: [
Last name: (Pan
Display name: [Yin Pan
Description: r
Office: i
Other... |Telephone number: r
E-fnail: jcrypto.class@gmail.com
Other...Web page: '
ApplyOK j Cancel
Above is a screenshot of Yin Pan's General AD properties. Notice that her E-mail address is listed as
crypto.class@qmail.com.
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Yin Pan Properties Jjxj
Member Of Dial-in Environment Sessions
Remote control Terminal Services Profile C0M +
General j Address ] Account | Profile ] Telephones Organization
Jjtle:
Department:
Company:
r Manager
Name:
Direct reports:
[Peter Lutz
Change.. Properties Clear
Matthew Bahrenburg
OK Cancel
Above is a screenshot of Yin Pan's Organization AD properties. Notice that her Manager is set to Peter Lutz.
Peter Lutz Properties 21*}
Member Of Dial-in j Environment Sessions
Remote control Terminal Services Profile C0M+
General Address j Account j Profile j Telephones ] Organization
6 Peter Lutz
First name: mm Initials: |
Last name: [Lutz
Display name: jPeter Lutz
Description; r
Office: r
Telephone number: i Other...
E-mail: jmwb1S54@rit.edu
Web page: Other...
OK j Cancel
Above is a screenshot of Peter Lutz's General AD properties. Notice that his E-mail address is listed as
mwb1654@rit.edu.
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12.4 Linking Log Messages to Active Directory
This section will demonstrate how it is possible to utilize organizational directory structures to
improve logging. By using a special process, we can query the Active Directory configurations shown
above and attach relevant information to all logged activity.
rtitii^JBJ'-3-tJa3l:iiypt''iiwifisiiijbaii/iiiJiiiJ/yi
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help
LDAPSEARCH [){
MANAGERS /usr/bin/ldapsearch -D adquery@thesis.rit.edu -w
'P8$$word'
-x -h ${AD}
-s sub -b
"dc=thesis,dc=rit,dc=edu"
"(saraiAccoiintNairie=${USER}*)
"
J grep manager
) nawk -F
*\CN='
'{print
$2}'
| nawk -F
"\,"
"{print
$1}"'
MGREMAIL=Vusr/bin/ldapsearch -D adquery@the5is.rit.edu -w
* P8S$word*
-x -h ${AD
} -s sub -b
"dc=the5is,dc=nt,dc=edu" M(CN=${MANAGER}*)"
| grep mail | nawk -F
s
\mail:
'
'{print
S2}''
echo "Manager=${MANAGER} ; Manage
rEmail=$-{MGREHAIL}"
}
0
Above is a screenshot of the LDAPSEARCH function used to query Active Directory. This function
can be expanded to include any additional information your organizationmay find relevant. For this
example, only the users manager and manager's e-mail addresses are attached.
"IsflllltoJ"" "
-; j <=> |l (Hi \iA
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help
$ ps -ef | grep LDAP
ypan 1238 1143 0 04:00 pts/1 00:00:00 grep LDAP
root 11Q26 1 0 01:34 pts/9 90:00:00 /bin/sh /usr/sbin/LDAPlogadder.k
sh
root 11022 11020 0 01:34 pts/0 00:00:00 /bin/sh /usr/sbin/LDAPlogadder. k
sh
$1
The LDAPSEARCH function is contained within a script called LDAPlogadder.ksh. This script is
executed as a continual process shown above.
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ELJJEJI.
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help
S Is -la /trnp | grep LDAP
prw-r--r-- 1 syslog adm 0 2008-03-30 03:58 .LDAPaddpipe
The LDAPlogadder.ksh script also creates a "named
pipe"
on the system. This pipe is a file that the
SUDO logs are written to after each SUDO command is executed. The process shown in the previous
screenshot reads in each log, executes the LDAPSEARCH function, and makes the appropriate additions
to each log message. The logs are then pushed to a location of your choice. Usually this location is
back through syslog to be sent to an outside logging and reporting system.
syditltp i*-*fDita,lz&u*j} - yatlte.
File Edit View Search Tools Documents Help
New Open Save
Ur
Print. Find Replace
suclologs Q
Mar 30 01:50:19 jars-desktop logger: Mar 30 01:50:19 jars-desktop sudo:
mbahrenburg : TTY=pts/l ; PWD=/home /mbahrenburg ; USER=root ; C0MMAND=/bin/
Is ; TICKET =3 ; Manager=Yin Pan ; ManagerEmail=crypto .class@gmail .com
Mar 30 01:55:51 jars-desktop logger: Mar 30 01:55:51 jars-desktop sudo:
mbahrenburg : TTY=pts/l ; PWD=/horne /mbahrenburg ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/
Is ; TICKET =3 ; Manager=Yin Pan ; ManagerEmail=crypto . classOgmail .com
Mar 30 01:57:00 jars -desktop logger: Mar 30 01:56:10
jars- desktop sudo:
mbahrenburg : TTY=pts/l ; PWD=/home/mbahrenburg ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/
Is ; TICKET =3 ; Manager=Yin Pan ; ManagerEmail=crypto . class@gmail .com
Mar 30 03:56:34 jars -desktop logger: Mar 30 03:56:34
jars- desktop sudo:
mbahrenburg : TTY=pts/l ; Piv'D=/home /mbahrenburg ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bm/
Is ; TICKET =3 ; Manager=Yin Pan ; ManagerEmail=crypto . class@gmail .com
Mar 30 03:56:09 jars-desktop logger: Mar 30 03:58:09 jars-desktop sudo:
mbahrenburg : TTY=pts/l ; FWD=/home/mbahrenburg ; U5ER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/su
ypan ; TICKET=3 ; Manager=Yin Pan ; ManagerEmail=crypto. classQgmail. com
Mar 30 03:58:20 jars-desktop logger: Mar 30 03:58:20 jars-desktop sudo:
ypan : TTY=pts/l ; PWD=/home/mbahrenburg ; USER=root ; C0MMAND=/bm/ls ;
TICKET=0 ; Manage r=Peter Lutz ; Manage rEmail=mwbl654@nt .edu
Ln 1, Col 1 INS
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Above is a screenshot of the logs after being processed. As you can see, the users manager and
managers e-mail address have been added to the log messages per the specifications set up in Active
Directory. Mbahrenburg's manager is ypan with e-mail address crvpto.class(g>gmail.com and ypan's
manager is Peter Lutz with e-mail address mwbl654(o>rit.edu as in AD. Also see examples below that
were taken from this screenshot for a more readability.
Mar 30 03:58:09 jars-desktop sudo: mbahrenburg : TTY=pts/l ; PWD=/home/mbahrenburg ;
USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/su ypan ; TICKET=3 ; Manager=Yin Pan ;
ManagerEmail=crypto.class@gmail.com
Mar 30 04:01 :59 jars-desktop sudo: ypan : TTY=pts/l ; PWD=/home/mbahrenburg ; USER=root ;
COMMAND=/bin/su ; TICKET=0 ; Manager=Peter Lutz ; ManagerEmail=mwbl654@rit.edu
This attached information is not only useful for auditors reviewing these logs, but also for automated
report generation.
12.5 Automated Report Generation
This sectionwill demonstrate how the log additions shown in section 12.4 can aid in automated
reporting. Most reporting engines are designed to generate reports by performing keyword searches on
the logs. Now that management information is attached, the reporting engine can perform its searches
based offof this information. This way, if the organizational structure is changed within AD, the reports
will automatically be adjusted to reflect the change. Additionally, the attached e-mail address can be
used to forward the logs automatically to the appropriate reviewers. Please see the screenshot below for
a demonstration of the report generation process with these additions.
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File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help
root@j ars-desktop : /home/mbahrenburg/Desktop# . /ReportEngine . ksh ! t
******Proce55ing
j_0g5**
Found logs for Yin Pan. Sending logs to e-mail address: crypto.class@gmail.com
Mar 30 61:56:19 jars-desktop logger: Mar 36 81:59:19 jars-desktop sudo: mbahrenb
urg : TTY=pts/l ; PWD=/home/nnbahrenburg ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/ls ; TICKET=3
; Manager=Yin Pan ; Manage rEmail=c rypto.class@gmail.com
Mar 30 01:55:51 jars-desktop logger: Mar 39 01:55:51 jars-desktop sudo: mbahrenb
urg : TTY=pts/l ; PWD=/home/mbahrenburg ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/ls ; TICKET=3
; Hanager=Yin Pan ; Manage rEmail=c rypto.class@gmail.com
Mar 30 01:57:00 jars-desktop logger: Mar 30 01:56:10 jars-desktop sudo: mbahrenb
urg : TTY=pts/l ; PWD=/home/mbahrenburg ; U5ER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/ls ; TICKET=3
; Manager=Yin Pan ; ManagerEmail=c rypto.class@gmail.com
Mar 30 93:56:34 jars-desktop logger: Mar 30 03:56:34 jars-desktop sudo: mbahrenb
urg : TTY=pts/l ; PWD=/hoRie/inbahrenburg ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/ls ; TICKETS
; Manage r=Yin Pan ; Manage rEmail=crypto.class@gmail.com
Mar 30 03:58:09 jars-desktop logger: Mar 30 03:58:09 jars-desktop sudo: mbahrenb
urg : TTY=pts/l ; PWD=/home/mbahrenburg ; USER=root ; COHMAND=/bin/su ypan ; TIC
KET=3 ; Hanager=Yin Pan ; ManagerEmail-crypto.class@gmail.com
******Logs sucessfully sent to Yin
Pan******
Found logs for Peter Lutz. Sending logs to e-mail address: mwbl654grit.edu
Mar 30 93:58:20 jars-desktop logger: Mar 30 03:58:20 jars-desktop sudo: ypan
: TTY=pts/l ; PWD=/hoBie/nibahrenburg ; U5ER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/ls ; TICKET=0 ;
Manager=Peter Lutz ; Manage rEmail=mwbI654rit.edu
Mar 30 04:01:59 jars-desktop logger: Mar 30 04:01:59 jars-desktop sudo: ypan
: TTY=pts/l ; PWD=/home/nibahrenburg ; U5ER=root ; COHHAND=/bin/su ; TICKETS ;
Manager=Peter Lutz ; Manage rEttiail=mwbl654(cirit.edu
******Logs sucessfully sent to Peter
Lutz******
******Log Processing
Complete**-****
root@jars -desktop :/home/mbahrenburg/Desktop# [j
Notice that each manager is identified and all activity relating to thatmanager is forwarded to his or
her e-mail address automatically.
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File d* View Favores Tools t+tlp
Q| Back x]
- Favorites a* jbiiui ' ro ric *l *
-" ^r>ttp://rT^.g)rjle.i;om/rnafl/7u-l
4JIDM -&JT5ITtlrnVWofl -ij Cyber-ArkWebOent $j Cyber-ArkPasswordWaJt ^iAtman .<gj Psetec Conference ) Vahool Fnanco #j tGoogle
lam
Back to Inbox i Archive
Log Report
tint.iil Calendar Documents Photos Reade' Web more .
Qjg i
Compose Mail
Inbox
Starred &
Chats 9
Sent Mail
Drafts
All Mail
Spam
Trash
Contacts
? Quick Conta
Matthew Bahrenburg
Delete Me P
matthew bahr
mbahrenburg
Add contact Show all
? Label
Ciypt9.cla9a@g1nnil.c0n1 1 Settings I tjejfi I Sign ogl
. Stiow search potions
| Search Mai] | Search the Wet; create a (liter
You Have 3 Secret Crushes - ww SlnglesChaMAII com - 7 People Wan! to Chal with You Try Our Chat Rooms
- 100% Free Nowl
Report Spam J j Delete I . Mor-; ^cton:-; *
nbo>
"Matthew Bahrenburg (RIT Stito me 1 46 pm (3 hours
?- 5;epK
? Invite a fm
Give Gmail to
Apr 5 18:42:25 jars-desktop logger: Apr 5 18:42:25 jars-desktop sudo: mbahrenburg : TTY=pts/0 :
PWD=/home/mbahrenburg/Desktop : USER=root : COMMAND=/bin/cat sudologs ; TICKET=3 ;
Manager=Yin Pan ; ManaqetEmail-cr/Dto.class(5>gmail.com
Apr 5 1 8:42:58 jars-desktop logger: Apr 6 1 8:42:25 jars-desktop sudo: mbahrenburg : TTY=pts/0 ;
PWD=/home/mbahrenburg/Desktop : USER=root : COMMAND=/bin/cat sudologs ; TICKET=3 ;
Manager=Yin Pan ; Manager Email=cr/pto.class(5>qmail.com
Apr 5 1 8:42:59 jars-desktop logger: Apr 5 1 8:42:58 jars-desktop sudo: mbahrenburg :
TTY=unknown : PWD=/home/mbahrenburg ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/usr/sbin/synaptic ;
Manager=Yin Pan : ManagerEmail=crypto.class(5>qmail.com
Apr 5 1 8:50:37 jars-desktop logger: Apr 5 1 8:50:37 jars-desktop sudo: mbahrenburg :
TTY=unknown ; PWD=/home/mbahrenburg ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/usr/bin/software-properties-
gtk ; Manager=Yin Pan : ManaqerEmail=cr;pto.class(3>qmail.com
Apr 5 18:50:45 jars-desktop logger: Apr 5 18:50:43 jars-desktop sudo: mbahrenburg :
TTY=unknown : PWD=/home/mbahrenburg ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/usr/sbin/synaptic ;
Manager=Yin Pan : Manage! Email=crypto.classt13>qmail. com
Apr 5 1 8:55:1 2 jars-desktop logger: Apr 5 1 8:55:1 2 jars-desktop sudo: mbahrenburg : TTY=pts/0 :
PWD=/home/mbahrenburg/Desktop ; USER=root : COMMAND=/bin/cat sudologs : TICKET=3 :
Manager=Yin Pan : ManagerEmail=cr-/pto.class(cx>gmail.com
Anr 5 18 '55 47 iar<i-Hesktnn
lonner-
Anr 5 18'55'1 3 iar^-HAsktnn snHn; mhahrenhnrn ; TTY=nK/0
|Ma;teri Thes - Microsoft Word|
Screenshot from crvpto.class@gmail.com showing that all logs for Yin Pan have been forwarded to
her designatedmailbox.
13 Documentation & Policies
Once the system is set up and functional, documentation and policies must be written for all
components of the integrated system. This is crucial not only for passing an audit, but for enforcing how
the system is used to the rest of the organization.
13.1 Documentation
Having good documentation is crucial to passing an audit. Auditors will rely heavily on the
documentation to learn the capabilities of the system and to devise a testing plan. Without
documentation, the systems operations are either left up the auditor's interpretation, which can be
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devastating if the interpretation is incorrect. Or the auditormust spend countless hours with the systems
administrators learning the system. This can be extremely costly to an organization. Each year, you
may have a new auditor auditing the system. They can leverage findings from previous years for
guidance but still must gain their own knowledge of the system. This would require consultations with
the systems administrators each year, disrupting the administrator's work and costing the organization
additional auditing fees that are not cheap by anymeans. Additionally, if the administrators leave the
company, the documentation can help new employees learn their new job responsibilities. Therefore,
having good documentation of all processes is essential.
13.2 Policies
Having documented and approved policies can also be crucial to the passing of an audit. With new
methods being set in place to perform one's job function, itmay be difficult to enforce that these new
methods are used. Many times, a user will try to bypass new systems since they feel that they are a
hindrance to their job. Others will have difficulty because they are not aware of the new procedures and
use them incorrectly. This is where policies come in to play. When a policy is approved, it should be
made available to all affected users within the organization. It is there responsibility to read and fully
understand the new policy before continuing work on the affected systems. If at any time the policy is
broken, it can be used as guidance to help the user understand what they have done wrong, and in some
cases provide the reinforcement to punish the user accordingly. For instance, if a user is violating policy
and damages the integrity of financial data, that user can be rightfully terminated. If that user than tries
to sue the organization for wrongful termination, they can use the policy for legal justification.
Masters Thesis Page 73 5/22/2008
Policies can be extremely useful in other legal matters as well, for instance data retention. If
your
organizations data retention policy is only set for three months, than you are not legally liable to present
any data beyond threemonths if subpoenaed. This can save the organization millions ofdollars in data
gathering fees during a lawsuit. However, if your retention policy is seven years, than you are liable for
the retention of data up to seven years. This is why having well crafted policy that bestmeets the needs
of the organization is very important. Also note that certain government regulations stipulate a
mandatoryminimum retention policy that your organizationmay need to follow. HIPPA for instance
requires a retention policy of five to six years, depending on the type ofdata. Be sure that your retention
policymeets or exceeds these minimum requirements ifyour organization must abide by any
government regulations.
14 Training
Training is a key element that is commonly overlooked inmany organizations. With an adequately
trained staff, users are far less likely to affect system availability or unknowingly aid in a security
breach.
14.1 System Training
When implementing new systems, most users will be unfamiliarwith how theywork or how the
new system may affect their jobs. Others will understand the usage of the new system but resist using it
since they believe it is unnecessary. Until strictly enforced, theywill continue to perform their jobs as
they always have, which could be detrimental to the organization during an audit. Therefore adequate
training for all users expected to use any system should be provided. This training should not only
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include technical details and a usage overview, but also reasoning behind using the system.
Ifusers
understand why systems are in place and how they help the organization, they will bemore apt to using
them without resistance. With a well-trained user base, there will be less usage issues requiring
correction and more acceptance for new system implementation.
14.2 Basic Security Training
Believe it or not, the weakest security link in any organization is not the security systems
themselves, but the users. Most untrained users can easily be manipulated to give out restricted
information or unknowingly provide security vulnerabilities by not following or intentionally bypassing
security policies for convenience. Attackers know this and attempt to exploit it wherever possible. By
simply calling a user impersonating a technical support representative and asking for their password,
finding passwords written under user keyboards, exploiting users who leave their computer systems
unlocked, finding secured doors propped open, etc are all common. However with proper training so
that the users are aware of the potential dangers of these activities, you can drastically reduce this risk.
15 Testing
Now that these systems are in place and the users are trained and performing their jobs in a
compliant manner, it is time to verify that the systems are working as documented. For Sarbanes-Oxley
section 404, it is management's responsibility to perform the initial testing. Theywill evaluate each
system and attest to its effectiveness. Auditors will take the evaluations provided bymanagement and
perform their own testing. Ideally, the auditors will agree with management's findings and no additional
work is required. Otherwise, the auditors will come to their own conclusions regarding the system
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effectiveness. In this case, management will work with the auditors and try to come to an agreement.
Regardless if an agreement is made, the external auditors opinion trumps anything provided by
management for the final audit report.
The test findings are then reviewed by the organizations audit committee and submitted to the
public. Obviously this report can either hurt or help the organization, depending on the results. If the
test results are positive, than investors will have assurance that the organizations financial records are
accurate. If the test results are negative, it could discourage investors for fear ofpotentially fraudulent
activity.
The test findings from previous years can then be applied to following audits, saving a considerable
amount of time and money. For automated systems such as the one discussed in this document,
providing that no drastic changes are made, previous findings that demonstrate its effectiveness can be
relied upon for subsequent audits. Therefore a smaller sampling ofdata and less time is required to
show the system is still effective. Also previous findings showing weaknesses will be reviewed to
verify corrective actions have been taken and improvements are beingmade. Ideally each annual audit
with show more improvement, allowing the auditors to relymore on the controls and perform less
testing. However without an automated solution, each year auditors must continually test themanual
processes since their implementations are less reliable. Therefore automated solutions are not only ideal
to reduce administrative overhead, but are extremely advantageous during an audit.
16 Conclusion
Over the years, theft and manipulation of financial and health related data have caused an
increased need for government intervention. These interventions, such as the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of
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2002 help ensure the integrity and protection of such data. These interventions however are left to
interpretation and may be difficult to determine an appropriate solution to meet government standards.
By following the guidelines set forth in this thesis, one can establish sufficient controls to mitigate risk
in accordance to the COBiT and COSO frameworks and Sarbanes-Oxley compliance. The
implementation of automated solutions for User IdentityManagement, Privileged Access Controls,
ChangeManagement Controls, etc not onlymeet these requirements, but also reduce administrative
overhead, prevents user initiated mistakes, and lowers auditing costs. This ensures the stability of each
system and reduces the risk of fraudulent activity, enabling future growth of the organization.
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